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Corporate Governance, Financial Slack 
and Firm Performance: 





This paper presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between 
financial slack and firm performance using a large panel data set of the U.S. 
and the U.K. firms. Conducting dynamic GMM regressions, the empirical 
analysis finds that there are the negative relationship between slack and 
performance in the U.S. and the positive relationship in the U.K. These 
empirical findings support the hypothesis that the relationship between 
slack and performance differs across corporate governance systems. The 
novelty of the paper lies in its demonstration of the conclusion on the role 
of corporate governance in the relationship between slack and performance 
as well as the fact that we could obtain the result by comparing the two 
countries—the U.S. and the U.K—that have been regarded as belonging to a 
single corporate governance system.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial Slack, Organizational Slack, 
GMM Regression
INTRODUCTION
The current study investigates the relationship between financial 
slack and firm performance and the moderating role of corporate 
governance on the relationship. While some empirical studies 
analyze the impact of slack on firm performance, there exists little 
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systematic research on the effect of different corporate governance 
structures on the relationship between slack and performance. 
Since the pioneering study of Berle and Means (1932), there 
has been growing literature on corporate governance. During the 
1970s and 1980s, corporate governance research examines an 
individual governance mechanism focusing on U.S. corporations. 
Since the early 1990s, the research has begun to study the possible 
impact of differing institutional environments on the structure 
and effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, which 
seems to be triggered by the wave of globalization (for a survey, see 
Denis and McConnell 2003). It is now established that corporate 
governance systems differ substantially around the world. By using 
a large panel data set of the U.S. and the U.K., this study examines 
the relationship between slack and performance under different 
corporate governance systems in order to examine whether different 
corporate governance systems affect the relationship between slack 
and performance.
In the study, financial slack is regarded as a kind of organizational 
slack, widely discussed in the organization literature. Organizational 
slack is generally defined as the excess resources available to the 
organization, such as financial slack resources and slack in human 
resources. For example, organizational slack includes redundant 
employees, unused capacity, unnecessary capital expenditures, 
increases in the margins and revenues (Nohria and Gulati, 
1996: 1246), dividends paid in excess of those required to keep 
stockholders, wages paid in excess of those required to maintain 
labor, and public services provided in excess of those required (Cyert 
and March 1963: 42). We discuss the effect of organizational slack 
on firm performance, and limit the empirical analysis to financial 
slack since other kinds of slack resources are difficult to measure 
accurately. Similarly, we employ return on assets (ROA) as a proxy 
for firm performance in the empirical analysis since it is relatively 
easy to measure accurately.
The word ‘slack’ often carries a negative nuance. For example, 
the basic reason for implementing organizational downsizing 
is to eliminate organizational slack and thereby improve firm 
performance. However, theoretical discussions do not unambiguously 
support such an idea. While many studies deal with the issues of 
organizational slack and its effect on firm performance, there seems 
to be no consensus on the directionality of the effect of slack on 
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performance. Theories based on agency costs tend to suggest the 
negative impact of organizational slack on firm performance, but 
traditional organization theories such as the behavioral theory 
of the firm argue for the positive association between slack and 
performance. 
Accordingly, it is not theoretically obvious to determine whether 
the effect of organizational slack on firm performance is positive 
or negative, and thus this issue is best left to empirical work. 
Unfortunately, previous empirical studies show mixed evidence. A 
meta-analysis by Daniel et al., (2004) shows that previous empirical 
studies provide conflicting results. They examine 76 previous 
empirical findings and find the 51 positive, 13 negative, 11 mixed 
effects as well as one insignificant effect. It seems to be clear that 
organizational slack affects organizational performance, but the 
direction of the effect of slack on performance is still not obvious, 
theoretically and empirically. 
In order to explain why existing evidence on the effect of 
organizational slack on firm performance does not deliver clear 
results, we focus on the possible moderating role of corporate 
governance system in the relationship between slack resources and 
organizational performance. The basic idea is that there exists the 
complex trade-off between the theoretically discussed costs and 
benefits of organizational slack and that which one is dominant 
can depend on the corporate governance system prevalent in 
the country. We compare the corporate governance systems of 
the U.S. and the U.K., and conduct an empirical analysis using 
extensive panel data of the U.S. and U.K firms to determine 
whether organizational slack have different roles depending on the 
corporate governance system of the country. In addition, since the 
inconclusiveness of the existing research might be due to technical 
limits of empirical studies, we try to overcome empirical problems by 
using a large data set and robust estimation techniques.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first discuss 
the corporate governance systems of the two countries—the U.S. 
and the U.K.—to gain some insight about the potential difference 
of institutional settings of the two countries. In the next section, 
we set forth the contrasting theories of the relationship between 
organizational slack and firm performance. Then, the data and 
the empirical methods used in the study are described. Next, 
the empirical findings and the interpretation of the findings are 
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presented. Finally, a conclusion is provided addressing the potential 
difference between the U.S. and the U.K. corporate governance 
systems and its role in the relationship between slack and 
performance. Future research possibilities are also presented.
RESEARCH SETTING
Are there differences between the U.S. and the U.K. regarding 
corporate governance? This question seems to have received almost 
no attention in corporate governance research since the U.S. and the 
U.K. have been regarded as having the same (or similar) corporate 
governance structure. In general, the comparative studies of 
corporate governance distinguish between the shareholder-centered 
model and the stakeholder-centered model. The former, which is 
exemplified by the U.S. and the U.K., includes strong shareholder 
rights, dispersed ownership focusing on short-term market values, 
arm’s length creditor financing through equity, and active markets 
for corporate control. The latter, which is found in continental 
European countries and Japan, includes strong stakeholder rights, 
concentrated ownership focusing on long-term social values, long-
term relational debt finance, and weak markets for corporate 
control. Thus, corporate governance researchers put focus on the 
difference between the Anglo-American shareholder model and the 
European stakeholder model. Their interest is not in the difference 
between the Anglo-American countries. Most corporate governance 
research regards the U.S. and the U.K. corporate governance 
systems as a single model. In this context, the differences between 
the U.S. and the U.K. have not been taken seriously.
Nevertheless, there exist a few studies that address the difference 
between the two Anglo-American countries. Toms and Wright (2005) 
compare the U.S. and the U.K. systems of corporate governance in 
the period 1950-2000 and conclude that there are differences of 
corporate governance systems between the two countries and that 
the differences are largely due to the differing roles of economic 
institutions in the process of industrialization. They claim that 
while large firms in the U.S. exert concentrated economic power 
which causes conflicts between accountability and efficiency, British 
capital leaves the country because of lack of opportunity to develop 
large-scale businesses and thus domestic firms in the U.K. should 
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depend on a network- and alliance-style economic system. 
Aguilera et al. (2006) identify the differences between the U.S. 
and the U.K. regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR), and 
suggest that the differences in CSR reflect the differences in the 
corporate governance arrangements in the two countries. They 
argue that dominant institutional investors in the U.K. tend to focus 
on long-term values rather than on short-term earnings, and that, 
in contrast, the U.S. is dominated by institutional investors with 
the short-term outlook. Williams and Conley (2005) also explore the 
difference between the U.S. and the U.K. and argue that the unified 
Anglo-American model may be breaking down as a result of CSR 
advocates’ actions and governments’ and companies’ reactions. They 
conclude that the U.S. corporate governance remains focused on 
shareholder model, while the U.K. seems to be moving toward the 
stakeholder model.
Combining these studies, we propose that the U.S. corporate 
governance system is characterized by large-scale corporations with 
a short-term orientation whereas the U.K. system is characterized as 
a network system with a relatively long-term orientation. Large-scale 
corporations with a short-term orientation are likely to be related 
to a setting in which agency problems do matter, while the network 
system with a long-term orientation can be more related to a setting 
in which managerial initiative is important. This is also confirmed by 
some other observations. For example, most large U.K. companies 
follow a dual leadership pattern and split the roles of CEO and the 
chairman of the board (Higgs 2003: 23). They typically separate legal 
responsibility for running the company between managers and the 
board. On the contrary, in most U.S. companies, the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board, which may imply concentrated power and 
ineffective monitoring, and the ownership is more dispersed than the 
U.K. (Aguilera et al. 2006: 148-149). These can imply the importance 
of agency problems in the U.S. and of managerial initiative in the U.K.
We suggest that these differences in corporate governance systems 
might cause the difference in the relationship between slack 
resources and firm performance, which is the focus of the following 
sections.
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
This section presents the competing theories of organizational 
slack and develops the hypothesis that corporate governance 
systems can affect the relationship between slack resources and 
firm performance. Before going into more detail about the theoretical 
background, some discussion of the concept and forms of financial 
slack to be used in the empirical analysis seems appropriate.
The Concept of Financial Slack
Financial slack (or organizational slack) appears in different 
forms in the literature. For example, Bourgeois and Singh (1983) 
divide slack resources into three categories in terms of the ease 
or quickness with which slack resources are recovered: (readily) 
available slack, recoverable (with some effort) slack, and potential 
slack. Bourgeois (1981) distinguishes between the slack that created 
deliberately by management and the slack that made available by 
the environment. Singh (1986) divides slack into absorbed slack and 
unabsorbed slack. The former refers to slack absorbed as costs and 
the latter refers to uncommitted liquid resources.
The present study focuses on the two extreme forms of slack—
available slack and potential slack—among the three kinds of slack 
introduced by Bourgeois and Singh (1983). Available slack refers to 
extra resources that are not yet committed to a specific expenditure 
and thus readily available. This kind of slack provides managers 
with the most flexibility. For example, cash and marketable 
securities represent available slack resources. Most empirical 
studies of slack and performance employ current ratio as a proxy 
for available slack (see Daniel et al. 2004). Current ratio refers to 
a liquidity ratio that measures a firm’s ability to pay short-term 
obligations and is calculated as current assets divided by current 
liabilities. Potential slack refers to resources that may be generated 
in the future by economic environmental changes. For example, the 
capital-raising potential such as changes in stock price represents 
potential slack. Many empirical studies use leverage ratios such 
as the ratio of debt-to-equity to measure potential slack (see 
Daniel et al. 2004). If the debt-to-equity ratio decreases, “future 
interest payment to obligations are reduced, as is the potential for 
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outsiders (creditors) to affect managerial policy” (Bourgeois 1981: 
37). Increasing values in the debt-to-equity ratio actually indicate 
decreasing potential slack levels. Note that the two kinds of slack-
-available slack and potential slack--correspond to ‘high discretion 
slack’ and ‘low discretion slack’ suggested by Sharfman et al. (1988), 
respectively.
Previous empirical studies show that the effects of slack resources 
on organizational performance and behavior can be different 
depending on the types of slack resources. For example, Bergh and 
Lawless (1998) find that available slack has a positive effect on 
performance while potential slack has a negative effect. Lin et al. 
(2009) differentiate between high-discretion slack and low-discretion 
slack, and find that a there are a U-shaped relation between high-
discretion slack and internationalization and a positive relation 
between low-discretion slack and internationalization. Different 
kinds of slack resources may affect firm performance differently. 
Thus, it may be necessary to consider the multidimensional aspects 
of slack when assessing its effect on firm performance.
Competing Theories of the Role of Slack
Many researchers recognize that organizational slack is important 
in firm performance, but they would hardly agree on what role 
slack should play. While typical organization theories such as the 
behavioral theory of the firm tend to argue for the positive effect 
of slack resources on firm performance (e.g., see Cyert and March 
1963; Penrose 1959), some finance theories based on an agency 
perspective put focus on the negative effect of financial slack (e.g., 
see Jensen 1986). These two competing arguments are discussed in 
turn.
For behavioral theory of the firm, a firm consists of diverse 
interests of participants and they often conflict. In this context, 
slack represents “payments to members of the coalition in excess 
of what is required to maintain the organization” (Cyert and March 
1963: 36) and thus plays the role of conflict resolution. For example, 
Moch and Pondy (1977) show that organizational slack reduces 
unnecessary political activities within organizations. Thus, firms can 
use slack resources to minimize coordination costs within the firm 
to improve firm performance.
More importantly, slack resources provide a source of funds for 
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innovation projects (Cyert and March 1963), encourage the firm to 
experiment with new strategies (Hambrick and Snow 1977), and 
allow the firm to respond aggressively to shifting environmental 
demands (Cheng and Kesner 1997). Innovation is likely to improve 
firm performance since “product or process innovations alter an 
innovating firm’s competitive position against rivals, or strengthen 
its bargaining power vis-à-vis buyers or suppliers” and “the process 
of innovation transforms the firm itself, building up its internal 
capabilities in a variety of ways that create generic differences 
between innovating and non-innovating firms” (Geroski and Machin 
1993: 36). Thus, slack is expected to improve firm performance. 
Furthermore, organizational slack plays a stabilizing role in 
a rapidly changing economy (Cyert and March 1963) to affect 
performance positively. By controlling the level of organizational 
slack, the firm can absorb excess fluctuations caused by external 
environments. It has been widely accepted that organizations 
need to adapt to their changing environment, take advantage 
of environmental opportunities, and reduce external impacts to 
improve organizational performance (e.g., see Scott 1998).
In contrast to the behavioral view of the firm, many agency 
theorists view managers as agents of the shareholders in the firm, 
and claim that the less slack the firm has, the better, because 
managers have incentives to use slack resources solely for the lavish 
indulgence of management. Agency theory regarding corporate 
governance research puts the focus on an agency problem between 
shareholders and managers in the firm. The agency problem is 
caused by the fact that shareholders seek to increase firm value and 
managers pursue their own interests at the expense of the interests 
of shareholder. Without appropriate monitoring, managers would 
waste available resources to pursue their own interest. For example, 
as financial slack such as free cash flow increases, poor projects are 
likely to be financed since managers have incentives to invest slack 
resources in negative net present value projects to pursue their own 
interests (Jensen 1986). As a result, financial slack may jeopardize 
firm performance.
For agency theory, organizational slack is regarded as unnecessary 
costs. A practical implication of this view is related to organizational 
downsizing yielding economic efficiency. That is to say, eliminating 
organizational slack improves organizational performance. This 
perspective is also consistent with the view of Kornai (1979) on 
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soft-budget constraints. Kornai (1979) argues that slack resources 
of state-owned firms generated by soft-budget constraints lead to 
inefficient management.
Corporate Governance Systems and Slack
As discussed, for the behavioral theory of the firm, a positive 
relationship between financial slack and firm performance is 
expected. In this view, managers are assumed to perform a proactive 
role in improving firm performance by devoting slack resources to 
productive activities. Thus, managerial discretion can be beneficial 
to the firm and slack is a tool for realizing managerial visions. In 
contrast, agency theorists hold that an agency problem in the firm 
is a main source of inefficient management and slack is likely to be 
used by managers to pursue their interests at the expense of the 
interests of shareholders. In this view, managerial discretion needs 
to be constrained by appropriate corporate governance mechanisms. 
If not, managers are free to use slack resources to pursue their own 
interests since managers have incentives to use slack to extend their 
influence in the firm and increase perquisite consumption.
Putting these two competing arguments on the role of slack 
together, we would suggest that the positive relationship between 
financial slack and firm performance can be observed in such 
situations that managerial discretion is necessary to improve firm 
performance, but the negative relationship is observed in such 
situations that agency problems are severe. For example, managerial 
discretion might be important for small and young firms when 
growth opportunities are present, and in these cases, the positive 
relationship between slack and performance is likely to dominant. 
However, as discussed in the traditional corporate governance 
literature, agency problems would be severe for large firms with 
dispersed small shareholders, and in these cases, the negative 
relationship is expected. In the former case, slack resources can be 
useful tools for improving performance, but, in the latter case, slack 
resources induce managers to invest in poor projects.
We extend the above logic of the role of slack in different settings 
to country-level comparisons: Whether the relationship between 
slack and performance is positive or negative can depend on the 
institutional setting such as corporate governance system in which 
the firm operates. If we can distinguish between the corporate 
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governance system in which managerial discretion to devote slack 
resources should be exerted to improve firm performance and the 
corporate governance system in which agency problems are acute, 
we can expect that the positive relationship between slack and 
performance is prevalent in the former corporate governance system, 
but the negative relationship is dominant in the latter. 
As discussed, the U.S. corporate governance system is 
characterized by large-scale corporations with a short-term 
orientation whereas the U.K. system is characterized as a network 
system with a relatively long-term orientation. Considering that 
traditional corporate governance literature addresses the agency 
problem (‘the separation of ownership and control’) in large 
corporations with a dispersed ownership focusing short-term 
performance, we expect that while agency problems are more severe 
in the U.S. than in the U.K., the necessity of managerial discretion 
is stronger in the U.K. than in the U.S., since the network system 
with a long-term orientation in the U.K. can provide a favorable 
environment for managerial discretion to improve firm performance. 
Thus, according to the hypotheses, we predict that the positive 
relationship between slack and performance is observed for the U.K. 
data, but the negative relationship is observed for the U.S. data.
Thus, our hypothesis to be tested is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between financial slack and 
firm performance differs across corporate governance systems.
Hypothesis 1a: The relationship between financial slack and 
firm performance is positive in the corporate governance system in 
which managerial discretion is necessary to achieve organizational 
goals.
Hypothesis 1b: The relationship between financial slack and 
firm performance is negative in the corporate governance system 
in which agency problems are central.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The current study tries to assess the empirical validity of the 
hypotheses of financial slack by comparing the econometric results 
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between the U.S. and the U.K. In this section, the data and the 
empirical methods used in the study are introduced.
Sample
This study investigates panel data of publicly listed industrial 
firms in the U.S. and the U.K. over 19 years (1990-2008). A panel 
data analysis identifies a dynamic change in each firm over time and 
thus can provide more persuasive empirical evidence by overcoming 
econometric problems. The source of data is the OSIRIS database 
offered by Bureau Van Dijk. The database includes financial 
information on globally listed public firms. Some companies are 
eliminated from the sample used in the empirical analysis when 
the firms have a large amount of missing data on the necessary 
variables of the empirical analysis. The sample consists of 1852 
U.S. firms and 280 U.K. firms over 19 years. The total number of 
observations is 40402: 35188 for the U.S. and 5214 for the U.K. We 
expect that the data set with a large number of cross-section units 
observed for a large number of time periods provides a more useful, 
real-world application.
The variables used in the empirical study are selected as follows. 
As a proxy for firm performance, this study uses return on assets 
(ROA), defined as net income divided by total assets. A market-based 
measure such as Tobin’s Q is a popular proxy for firm performance 
in empirical studies of corporate governance, but due to the problem 
of data availability, we use the accounting-based measure. The 
accounting-based measure has a benefit as it is not susceptible to 
the psychology of investors and capital markets.
Two explanatory variables representing financial slack are 
included in the empirical analysis: current ratio (CUR) and debt-
to-equity ratio (DTE). Following other similar empirical studies, we 
employ current ratio (CUR) as a proxy for available slack and debt-
to-equity ratio (DTE) as a proxy for potential slack (refer to the 
meta-analysis by Daniel et al. 2004). We pay attention to whether 
the different types of slack are functionally equivalent or not. By 
including different kinds of financial slack as independent variables, 
we can check for the difference between the different variables of 
slack resources. Current ratio is a financial ratio indicating a firm’s 
market liquidity and ability to meet creditor’s demands. Debt-
to-equity ratio measures a firm’s financial leverage. Notice that 
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potential slack increases as debt-to-equity ratio decreases. That 
is, the coefficient of the debt-to-equity ratio is associated with the 
negative value of potential slack. In addition to slack variables, we 
employ a size variable calculated as a natural logarithm of total 
assets (LAS) to control for the effect of firm size on firm performance, 
following a lot of similar empirical studies.
The summary statistics of the variables and the correlation 
matrix are reported in table 1. The correlation matrix does not 
show a concern for a multicollinearity problem. We examine the 
multicollinearity problem through the variance inflation factor 
as well and the result also indicates no severe multicollinearity 
problem.
Econometric Methods
We use regression techniques in order to test the hypotheses 
discussed above. The basic empirical specification used in the 
empirical analysis is written as
ROAit = b0 + b1 CURi,t-1 + b2 DTEi,t-1 + fi + dt  + eit   (1)
where the subscript i refers to the firm, t refers to the time period, 
f is a firm-specific effect, d is a time-specific effect, and e is a 
stochastic error term. A lag structure is used in the model since 
there is a time delay between financial slack and its effect on firm 
performance. For example, slack resources can affect a firm’s ability 
Table 1. Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix



































































Note:  ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% 
levels. s.d. refers to standard deviation.
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to cope with environmental uncertainties, which, in turn, has an 
impact on firm performance. Especially, since potential slack is not 
a tool for managers to use immediately, the lag structure would be 
appropriate.
We estimate equation 1 by a fixed effects feasible GLS (FGLS) 
model suggested by Wooldridge (2002). Among the two main panel 
data models, fixed effects model and random effects model, we 
choose to use fixed effects model in which firm fixed effects are 
controlled for because random effects model is more appropriate 
when a data set is representative of a larger population, but the 
sample used in the study is drawn from listed companies of two 
countries and cannot be treated as a random sample from a 
population. We perform some relevant tests such as F test, LM 
test, and Hausman test to evaluate the usefulness of the models, 
and the test results favor fixed effects model. Another concern is 
about the classical assumptions of OLS, such as heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation, which are usually too restrictive for panel 
data. We conduct some tests for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation including LM test and BG test, and find the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. Thus, we use 
FGLS regression instead of OLS in order to control the problem. 
Fixed effects FGLS regression is carried out using R program (“pggls” 
command with “within” model option) in the empirical analysis.
We put attention on the omitted variable problem that equation 
1 is likely to encounter. A lot of literature in management, finance, 
and economics points out various determinants of firm accounting 
performance (or ROA), but this study does not control them due to 
the problem of data availability. Taking this problem into account, 
this study uses a dynamic panel data model in addition to equation 1:
ROAit = b0 + b1 ROAi,t-1 +  b2 CURi,t-1 + b3 DTEi,t-1 + fi + dt  +  eit       (2)
By including the lagged dependent variable as an independent 
variable, the dynamic model can control for the possible effects of 
omitted variables. The lagged performance variable can explain 
various determinants of performance in the previous year. Moreover, 
the lagged dependent variable included accounts for persistence in 
responses. In addition to equation 2, equation 3 using a t-2 lagged 
variable is also estimated as a robust method:
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ROAit = b0 + b1 ROAi,t-1 + b1.1 ROAi,t-2 + b2 CURi,t-1 + b3 DTEi,t-1 
         + fi + dt  + eit   (3)
In order to estimate the dynamic equations consistently, we use a 
system Generalized Method of Moments (system GMM) estimator of 
the kind suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). A difference GMM 
model developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is also used, but the 
result is not reported because the two models’ results are similar 
and the result of the former is more advanced and informative. 
GMM estimators are often used to obtain consistent estimates in 
dynamic models, but they are also subject to large finite sample 
biases when strong instrument variables are not available and the 
time period is short, which are typical problems observed in panel 
data. However, the long T panels of the data used in this study can 
help in avoiding the biases. We use two-year and earlier lags of ROA 
as GMM instruments. All lagged values except the first lag of ROA 
are valid as GMM instruments since, when equation 2 requires that 
E(eit ROAi,t-s) = 0 for all s > 0, it follows that for all s > 1, E(∆eit ROAi,t-s) 
= 0. 
In the GMM regressions, we conduct Sargan test and a test for 
second-order serial correlation of residuals to examine whether the 
model is correctly specified. Sargan test is a test of overidentifying 
restrictions in a statistical model. It evaluates the validity of the 
instruments used in the statistical model. The serial correlation 
test, called m2 test, also checks the specification of the model 
by evaluating the validity of t-2 variables as instruments. GMM 
estimation is carried out using R program (‘pgmm’ command with 
‘Twoways effect Two steps model’ option) in the empirical analysis.
We include firm size as a control variable, which is observed in 
many studies. In addition, the size variable has another implication. 
This study considers the possibility that financial slack has different 
effects on firm performance with different degrees of managerial 
discretion in the firm. Managers would be more active to use slack 
resources when they are given more discretion. Thus, the more 
discretion managers have, the more significant slack will be. For 
example, managerial discretion can be beneficial when it encourages 
firm-specific investment (Burkart et al. 1997). In this empirical 
analysis, firm size is included as a proxy for the degree of managerial 
discretion. As firm size increases, managerial discretion in the firm 
is likely to decrease (Mayers and Smith 1994: 643). We employ an 
Corporate Governance, Financial Slack and Firm Performance 17
interaction model using interaction terms of organizational slack 
and firm size to examine the moderating effect of the degree of 
managerial discretion:
ROAit = b0 + b1 ROAi,t-1 + b2 CURi,t-1 + b2.1 CURi,t-1*LASi,t-1   
         + b3 DTEi,t-1 + b3.1 DTEi,t-1*LASi,t-1 + fi + dt  +  eit  (4)
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This section reports and discusses the empirical findings of the 
regressions. As a preliminary step, we examine the results of fixed 
effects FGLS regression, which are shown in table 2. Note again that 
a positive coefficient for the debt-to-equity variable indicates the 
negative effect of potential slack on firm performance. For example, 
both the negative coefficient of current ratio and the positive 
coefficient of debt-to-equity for US in table 2 refer to the negative 
effects of slack (i.e., available slack and potential slack, respectively) 
on firm performance, although the coefficients are not statistically 
significant.
The FGLS regression results do not report significant coefficients. 
These results might be caused by omitted variable bias or other 
potential econometric problems. Thus, we turn attention to the 
results obtained from the dynamic GMM regression analysis, which 
are given in table 3. In contrast to the FGLS regression results, the 
GMM regression results reveal the significant and noteworthy effects 
of financial slack on firm performance as discussed below. The 
results also show the significant and positive coefficients of lagged 
performance variables as expected.














Note:  ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% 
levels. For regressions, figures are regression coefficient estimates and 
t-values are shown in parentheses.
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According to table 3, for the U.S. firms, financial slack has a 
negative effect on firm performance. The available slack term (CURt-1) 
has negative and statistically significant coefficients and this clearly 
implies a negative impact on firm performance. The potential slack 
term (DTEt-1) has positive coefficients, which is interpreted as a 
negative impact, although they are not statistically significant. 
Accordingly, in the U.S., slack resources are shown to have negative 
effects on firm performance, which supports hypothesis 1b. On 
the contrary, the regression analysis using the data of the U.K. 
firms reports a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between financial slack and firm performance. Both available 
slack represented by current ratio and potential slack represented 
by debt-to-equity ratio appear to have positive impacts on firm 
performance. This supports hypothesis 1a. Although Sargan test 
and m2 test do not show acceptable results, we can get desirable 
ones if we use the difference GMM estimation instead of the system 
GMM estimation, and it does not change the conclusion.






































































Note:  ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% 
levels. For regressions, figures are regression coefficient estimates and 
t-values are shown in parentheses. Sargan is the Sargan test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 with degrees 
of freedom in parentheses. m2 is a serial correlation test of order 2, 
asymptotically standard normal. For tests, figures are z or χ2 values and 
p-values are shown in parentheses.
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In sum, the regression results report the negative effect of slack 
on firm performance in the U.S. and the positive effect in the U.K. 
This implies that agency problems seem to be more important in 
the U.S. than in the U.K., and managerial discretion to use slack 
resources to improve firm performance is important in the U.K. 
more than in the U.S. Thus, these results support hypothesis 1 that 
the relationship between slack and performance depends on the 
corporate governance system in which the firms operate.
The results of the regressions using interaction terms are 
presented in table 4. The interaction model is used in order to 
determine whether the degree of managerial discretion calculated 
as firm size affects the relation between financial slack and firm 
performance.






























































































Note:  ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% 
levels. For regressions, figures are regression coefficient estimates and 
t-values are shown in parentheses. Sargan is the Sargan test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 with degrees 
of freedom in parentheses. m2 is a serial correlation test of order 2, 
asymptotically standard normal. For tests, figures are z or χ2 values and 
p-values are shown in parentheses.
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The interaction regression indicates that the moderating effect 
of managerial discretion seems to exist only in the U.K. firms. 
For the U.S. firms, we could not find any significant estimates of 
both slack variables. In contrast, for the U.K., the interaction term 
of available slack represented by current ratio and managerial 
discretion represented by firm size has a significant and negative 
estimate. It indicates that as firm size increases, that is, as the level 
of managerial discretion decreases, the positive effect of available 
slack on firm performance decreases in the U.K. The result of the 
interaction model confirms the result of the linear model. The linear 
regression shows a positive effect of slack on performance in the 
U.K., which can indicate a significant role of managerial discretion. 
The interaction model confirms this interpretation by reporting the 
negative coefficient of the interaction terms between financial slack 
and firm size. The degree of managerial discretion matters for the 
relation between slack and performance in the U.K.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The present paper presents an empirical analysis of financial slack 
and firm performance using a large panel data set of the U.S. and 
the U.K. firms. Conducting dynamic GMM regressions, the empirical 
study finds that there are the negative relationship between slack 
and performance in the U.S. and the positive relationship in 
the U.K. These empirical findings support hypothesis 1 that the 
relationship between financial slack and firm performance differs 
across corporate governance systems. The U.K. evidence confirms 
hypothesis 1a that the relationship between financial slack and 
firm performance is positive in the corporate governance system in 
which managerial discretion is necessary to achieve organizational 
goals. The U.S. evidence is consistent with hypothesis 1b that 
the relationship between financial slack and firm performance 
is negative in the corporate governance system in which agency 
problems are central. The regression using interaction terms of 
organizational slack and managerial discretion strengthens these 
conclusions. 
Two relevant studies are Lee (2010) and Lee (2011). Lee (2010) 
investigates a panel data set of the U.K. firms by using the random 
effects FGLS regression technique and finds a U-shaped effect of 
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potential slack and a positive effect of available slack. Lee (2011) 
examines a panel data set of the U.S. firms by using the fixed 
effects FGLS regression technique and finds positive effects of both 
available slack and potential slack. These previous findings are 
not consistent with the current finding. It seems that the previous 
empirical studies do not use a dynamic regression model, and thus 
fail to consider the dynamic nature of the relationship between slack 
and performance.
The novelty of the paper lies in its demonstration that the 
relationship between financial slack resources and firm performance 
differs depending on corporate governance systems and that we 
reach the conclusion by comparing the regression results between 
the two countries—the U.S. and the U.K—which have been regarded 
as belonging to a single corporate governance system. The contrast 
between the U.S. and the U.K. derived from the empirical evidence of 
financial slack is also related to the previous literature addressing 
the question of the institutional difference between the U.S. and the 
U.K.: Aguilera et al. (2006) and Toms and Wright (2005) point out 
that the U.S. corporate governance system is characterized by large-
scale corporations with a short-term orientation and the U.K. system 
is characterized as a network system with a relatively long-term 
orientation. Large-scale corporations with a short-term orientation 
are likely to be related to a setting in which agency problems are 
central, while the network system with a long-term orientation 
can be more related to a setting in which managerial initiative 
is important. Consequently, the present empirical study of the 
relationship between slack and performance confirms the previous 
studies of the difference between the U.S. and the U.K. corporate 
governance systems.
Nevertheless, we need to note that this empirical study is 
not a complete examination of the corporate governance issue. 
The relationship between financial slack and firm performance 
represents just one aspect among a lot of corporate governance 
factors. An empirical study of organizational slack can provide 
a ‘hint’ for the question regarding the difference of the U.S. and 
the U.K corporate governance systems, but cannot be a thorough 
investigation of the question. In order to study the corporate 
governance settings, we need to examine various aspects of 
corporate governance mechanisms such as ownership structure, 
finance structures, decision making processes, etc. simultaneously, 
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which is left for the future. This empirical evidence of the relation 
between slack and firm performance can be a starting point for the 
research investigating differential settings of corporate governance.
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